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Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education:
Understanding the Schism Between
Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty
Kristen Konrad Robbins*
I. Introduction
If we legal writing faculty' know one thing for sure, it is that what we
teach is absolutely essential to our students' success, yet it continues to be
grossly, even embarrassingly, undervalued in legal education. To the
practicing bar, those attorneys educated by but now outside the academy, its
inferior status often comes as a surprise. For the few who leave practice and
return to law school to teach, surprise turns to outrage when they learn that
legal research and writing is the stepchild of the law school curriculum.
Judges and lawyers consider it the "single most important course in law
school,"2 and students immediately recognize its importance to their careers.
Nevertheless, roughly thirty years after their inception, legal research and
writing courses continue to be under-credited and under-staffed. The average
number of credits per semester for a first-year legal research and writing
course is two,3 as compared to three or four credits for a doctrinal course like
torts or contracts. The number of students per legal writing class can range
anywhere from thirteen to 120, with legal writing faculty reading up to 7,600
pages of student writing in one semester.4
Even more outrageous is the fact that legal writing faculty are eligible for
tenure at only a handful of schools, and their salaries remain strikingly lower
than those of their colleagues who teach doctrinal courses. Of the 178
reported law schools in a 2005 survey of legal writing programs conducted by
the Legal Writing Institute (LW) and the Association of Legal Writing
Directors (ALWD), only thirteen percent have tenured or tenure-track
teachers hired specifically to teach legal writing.5 Although women comprise
just twenty-six percent of tenured or tenure-track positions in law school
* 0 Kristen Konrad Robbins 2006. Professor of Legal Research and Writing, Georgetown
University Law Center. B.A., Wellesley College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center.
Special thanks to Linda Berger for suggesting that I contribute to this issue and to my husband
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1 This shorthand phrase includes legal writing faculty who teach research and legal writing
faculty who coordinate the teaching of research with other faculty or law school librarians.
2 Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Geader and Ll l Vnin Law Schs' Dirty Lik
Samrcr, 16 Berkeley Women's LJ. 1, 5 (2001).
3 Se Assn. Leg. Writing Directors & Leg. Writing Inst., 2005 Skrj Row/Ar 7,
http://www.alwd.og (accessed Apr. 9, 2006) [hereinafter 2005 Srv Rumk4/].
4 Id. at 59.
5 See id at 47.
faculties generally, they comprise roughly semn-thrm percnt of legal writing
faculty.6 One of law schools' "dirty little secrets" is that female faculty earn
less than male faculty, 7 but women who teach legal writing earn even less than
women teaching doctrinal courses. How much less is difficult to determine
because salaries for male and female doctrinal faculty are also well-kept
secrets. Of the 190 law schools surveyed by the Society of American Law
Teachers for the 2004-05 academic year, ninety-six schools - fifty-one
percent - refused to provide salary information,8 and thirty-nine of those
schools are in the top fifty, according to U.S. News and World Report
ratings.9
What we do know is that median salaries for full professors in the United
States ranged from roughly $78,000 (Inter-American University of Puerto
Rico School of Law) to $183,000 (University of Michigan) and perhaps higher.
The median salary for legal writing faculty as of 2005 was somewhere between
$50,000 and $59,999; the average was roughly $57,000.10 Only hwpercnt of
the schools in the 2005 LWI/ALWD Survey pay their legal writing faculty
more than $100,000.11 Stanchi and Levine estimate that in 1998, legal writing
faculty earned "57% of the median salaries of assistant, tenure-track
professors of doctrinal subjects, 51% of the median salaries of associate
professors, and 40% of the median salaries of full professors."12 In 1998, the
salary difference between legal writing faculty and full professors in real
dollars was roughly $56,000.13 That difference is likely to be even greater
today.
6 Stanchi & Levine, mpra n. 2, at 4 n. 3.
7 Id at 4.
SSee Society of American Law Teachers, SALT Eqako, http://www.saltaw.otg/EQ-
Feb2005.pdf (accessed Feb. 12,2006).
9 Se U.S. News and World Report, Amviwa's Best Gradale Scheok 2006: Top 100 Law
Schook, http://www.usnews.com (accessed Feb. 12,2006).
10 Sw 2005 SxnV Rax, skpw n. 3, at 54. This is true without regard to the number of
years the legal writing professor has been teaching. Sue Stanchi & Levine, noprm n. 2, at 11.
11 2005 Smoyl Rmwdr, sxpm n. 3, at 54.
12 Ann C. McGinley, Dhpirimadin in Oar Mids. Lw SChoo' PtenI Labifyfor EplojMt
PAaides, 14 UCLA Women's LJ. 1, 8 (2005) (citing Stanchi & Levine's survey and raising
serious questions about these practices violating Title VI1). As Professors Stanchi and Levine
point out, a legal writing professor, receiving five percent annual increases would have to work
eighteen years to earn the median salary of a full professor colleague. During that time of
course, the full professor's salary would continue to increase, and the legal writing professor
would be in the situation of "getting ever closer to her goal, but never reaching it." Stanchi &
Levine, pra n. 2, at 11-12.
13 Stanchi & Levine, spra n. 2, at 11.
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II. The Dual Bias Against Legal Writing: Discrimination on the Basis
of Gender and Intellect
Given the increasing importance of legal research and writing to law
students, 4 how do we explain this ongoing disparity? At a minimum, the
disparity reflects gender discrimination, pure and simple. As Stanchi and
Levine state:
[L]aw schools have treated the teaching of legal writing as "women's
work" While the high percentage of women found teaching legal
writing may not always be the result of conscious discrimination, the
gender disparity certainly reflects an institutional willingness to take
advantage of the position of women lawyers.15
Stanchi and Levine explain that in the 1970s and 1980s, law schools were
expanding, and there was public pressure to provide law students with more
practical instruction. This need was met by the influx of highly skilled women
in the legal profession, who were willing to take low-paying, low-status jobs
for family reasons.16 As long as the women hired to teach legal writing were
"not really faculty,"17 they posed no threat to the established order. More
than twenty years later, the question is what enables this blatant discrimination
to continue? How, in good conscience, can law schools - "the bastion[s] of
1 Recent studies indicate that the research and writing preparedness of matriculating law
students is on the decline. As a 2003 Report of The National Commission on Writing in
America's Schools and Colleges demonstrates, students are coming to law school with
increasingly deficient writing skills. For example, the traditional senior research paper "is
rapidly being abandoned" in American high schools, and "more than 50 percent of first-year
college students are unable to produce papers relatively free of language errors." The Natl.
Commn. on Writing in America's Schools and Colleges, The Nq gded ': The NadJbr a lWifti
Rakm'o 14, http://www.witingcommissioLorg/pm..downloads/writingcom/negectedr.pdf
(Apr. 2003) (accessed May 30, 2006).
A recent survey of law students at three high-rankdng law schools indicates that incoming
law students have deficient research skills. According to the survey, "students begin law school
without basic research skills." Kathryn Hensiak et al., Asseibg Iforrmai Lmray amg Firt
Year L" SYa. A SwVy to Merr Ra rh E4viwws and Preptiow, 96 L. Lib. J. 867, 868
(2004). Almost half of the 330 respondents were "unfamiliar with the library catalog," and
many did not know that "everything is not online." Id at 867-68.
For a recent report on the concurrent rate of decline in reading among American students,
see The National Endowment for the Arts, Readq at Rirk" A SmV of librivy Readiug i
Ami, http://www.neagov/pub/ReadingAtRiskpdf (une 2004) (accessed May 30, 2006).
1 5 Stanchi & Levine, wpem n. 2, at 23. See abo Richard H. Chused, The Hiriml and Rteidsi
of Miridid and lVmo o Aneima Lw Shool FawAies, 137 U. Pa. L Rev. 537 (1988); Pamela
Edwards, Teambig L4gI Wiin at I/omm'r lVork fi on the Fi of the Aeadmy, 4 Cardozo
Women's L.J. 75 (1997); Mary Ellen Gale, Lqa lWri,. The IAarsibk Takes a Litik Loqer, 44
Alb. L Rev. 298 (1980); McGinley, ss:im n. 12, at 3-4.
16 Stanchi & Levine, smpm n. 2, at 6-9.
17 Id at 7.
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liberalism"18 - shortchange students and treat their legal writing faculty like
second-class citizens?
There is a concomitant and even more insidious form of discrimination at
work here for which there is no obvious suspect class. It is discrimination on
the basis of perceived intellect. It's not just that most of us are women; it's
that we are women who aren't that smart teaching a course thats not that bard.
Although the majority of doctrinal, primarily male, law professors would agree
that legal writing is a valuable skill, it is only a skill; and frankly, it is too much
work to teach it. Legal education is about more intellectual pursuits, thei
pursuits. If we were as smart as they, we would still be practicing law,
teaching doctrinal courses, or writing books. This powerful assumption helps
explain why female deans and female faculty with tenure can look the other
way"9 or discourage legal writing faculty from pushing for tenure because it is
"too soon." Even the American Bar Association, which continues to mandate
more and more professional skills education in accredited law schools,20 has
refused to require that law schools afford legal writing faculty job security
reasonably similar to tenure.21
18 McGinley, mpra n. 12, at 3.
19 See Stanchi & Levine, nipivi n. 2, at 5.
20 Te ABA Standards require that accredited law schools provide substantial instruction
in "professional skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible participation
in the legal profession" as well as substantial instruction in legal analysis and reasoning, legal
research, problem solving, oral communication, and writing in a legal context, including at least
one rigorous writing experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing
experience after the first year. See ABA, 2005-2006 AA Stamdardsfor Appmw ofL"a Schek,
StA,,da 302: Cwniwhkw, 26-27, http://www.abane~org/legaled/standads/2005-2006standards
book.pdf (accessed May 15,2006).
21 In 2003 and 2004, the Legal Writing Institute and the Association of Legal Writing
Directors urged the ABA (1) to eliminate Standard 405(d), which permits schools to use short
term contracts to attract and retain legal writing faculty, and (2) to include fuil-time legal writing
faculty within Standard 405(c), giving legal writing faculty the same level of job security that
clinical faculty enjoy. The ABA rejected that proposal both times.
The ABA now requires that clinical faculty have job security reasonably similar to tenure
but not because it was convinced of clinicians' academic worthiness. Clinical programs were
formed in the late 1960s in response to unrelenting pressure from students and the practicing
bar. Sue Richard A Boswell, IMeig the Praike im Cixad Edaion and Sholarhi, 43 Hastings
L.J. 1187, 1187-88 (1992). Clinical faculty were not included in Standard 405(c) until 1996,
some thirty years later.
In March 2006, the American Law Deans Association (ALDA) filed a public comment in
response to the ABA's application for reaffirmation as a law school accrediting agency. In its
comment, ALDA objected to the ABA's efforts to require tenure or tenure-like status for deans
(how politically correct) and clinical faculty. As for legal writing faculty, ALDA stated it does
"not believe that ABA should require any specific terms and conditions of employment."
American Law Deans Association, PbIkc Comment On The Appicaion Of The Axeweai Bar
Asiodaton ('ABA") For R i vriation Of Rmog ion By The Scntary Of Edcation ('Secota') As A
Nation4 Romid Aafitiq Agmg In The Field Of eI Edcation (available at
http://www.nyu.edu/classes/siv/archives/alda.doc (accessed May 15, 2006)). At this writing,
a public hearing on the ABA's application is scheduled for June 2006.
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III. Tracing the Roots of Intellectual Discrimination to Philosophy's
Victory over Rhetoric as the Sole Path to Truth and Knowledge
The prevailing view among law school administrators and doctrinal legal
faculty is that although teaching writing may be time-consuming, it is not
really that hard. Legal writing teaches a process, not a substantive area of law.
The belief that writing is simply a vehicle for ideas acquired outside of the
writing process is so entrenched that it is difficult to challenge the
assumptions behind it.22 Indeed, it is thousands of years old and rooted in the
power struggle between philosophy and rhetoric that began in ancient Greece.
As early as the fifth century, B.C., the Sophists, who were courtroom
advocates as well as teachers of rhetoric, had already damaged rhetoric's
reputation.23 Some of the Sophists were known for trying spurious lawsuits,
and thus, "sophistry" soon became associated with clever but false argument.24
Plato, one of the earliest philosophers whose written work survives, was a
contemporary of the Sophists. Plato lived a contemplative life, devoted to
discovering universal truths and rejecting falsity. As far as Plato was
concerned, rhetoric was manipulative and could not lead to truth.2 s Only
dialectic, a reasoned exchange of ideas between two scholars, could elicit
truth, an absolute truth that existed outside of man. Political and legal
rhetoric were merely speechmaking, designed to persuade the audience about
a particular point of view. Since rhetoric served only to persuade, it could be
neither true nor false; at best, it was opinion.26 Plato especially despised
politicians, who curried favor by appealing to base pleasures, and lawyers, who
argued false points of view that could result in juries acquitting guilty men.27
Thus did Plato articulate a prejudice against rhetoric and legal argument that
survives today in the legal academy in the form of discrimination against legal
writing and its faculty.
Most damaging to rhetoric as a discipline, however, was Plato's view that
it lacked intellectual substance. In Gogias, one of Plato's famous dialogues,
Socrates challenges Gorgias, a Sophist, to articulate the subject matter of
rhetoric.28 Socrates states that all art forms (what today we call sciences), such
as medicine, arithmetic, and astronomy, exercise their influence through
persuasive speech, and therefore, to say that rhetoric is about persuasion is to
2 Se .4 Usa Eichhorn, lrt 'rg im the LgaAwdm: A Daenmiw SApphuwi, 40 Ariz. L
Rev. 105 (1998) (explaining the perceived difference between legal writing and doctrinal courses
as a "skills/substance dichotomy").
2 James L Golden et aL, The R i of Westow Thtght 7 (6th ed., Kendall/Hunt Publg.
Co. 1997).
24 Sw e.& The Oxford Couea Eq&h Dtiea 1098 (Catherine Sloanes ed., 2d ed., Oxfod
U. Press 2003).23 See g. Golden, stm n. 23, at 16.
26 So e& Plato, Phadaw in Conpka Wlork 539, 5 262c (ohn M. Cooper ed., Hackett Publg.
Co. 1997).
27 Sw id at 536-38, SS 259e-261d.
28 Sm Plato, Gogi, in Compkkt Work, nrm n. 26, at 795, SS 449d-e.
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say it has no subject matter of its own." Gorgias replies that rhetoric is the
art of persuasion in courts of law and other assemblies.30 Socrates declares
that rhetoric is not an art form at all; it is merely the imitation of one because
rhetoric has no subject matter of its own and deals only with what is "likely"
to be true. Socrates concludes this part of the dialogue by stating that rhetoric
is the counterpart to cookery, the false art of medicine. Just as cookery
appeals to the base pleasures of the body, rhetoric appeals to the base
pleasures of the soul. In Socrates' view, rhetoric confuses the soul, making it
difficult to distinguish that which is true and just from that which is false and
unjust.31
Aristotle was Plato's best student, but he could not have disagreed more
with Plato about the value of rhetoric as an independent art form. At the age
of seventeen, Aristotle moved to Athens to study at Plato's Academy, where
he remained for twenty years. Unlike Plato, Aristotle was interested in reality
as man perceived it as much as he was in absolute truth. In fact, he devoted
his career to systematic observation and classification of all aspects of life. He
wrote on a myriad of topics, including logic, rhetoric, philosophy, history,
politics, ethics, astronomy, physics, and psychology.32 His most famous
works include The Oranon (a collection of treatises on logic) 33 and Rhetor,34
and together, they embody Aristotle's views on the subject and practice of
rhetoric. Aristotle defined rhetoric as "the faculty of discovering in the
particular case what are the available means of persuasion."35 According to
Aristotle, a rhetorician attempts to persuade by appeals to logic (i.e., reason) as
well as to emotion and the speaker's character.36 He criticized the Sophists for
relying too heavily on emotional appeals and stressed appeals to logic.37
Unlike Plato, Aristotle thought rhetoric semd justice because the consideration
of opposing viewpoints could lead to truth in the courtroom.38 Echoing
Socrates in Plato's Go0jias, Aristotle described rhetoric as the counterpart to
dialectic - Plato's philosophical exchange of ideas leading to truth.39
Doctrinal legal faculty are like Plato: they take a philosophical, truth-
seeking approach to the study of law. Although they do teach law students,
29 Sre id at 796-97, SS 450d-451d.
30 Se id at 798, S 452e.
31 See iL at 806-09, SS 462a-465e.
32 Se e.g. Arirtik's Phyiw (Hippocrates G. Apostle ed. & trans., Peripatetic Press 1980);
Aristotle, The Nimarhean Ethks (Hugh Tredennick ed., J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Books
2004); Aristotle, Poida (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Pubig. Co. 1998).
33 See.& Aristotle, The Oignae (Harold P. Cooke & Hugh Tredennick eds., Harv. U. Press
1960). The Oianon includes Categaos, On Istpretatiio, PriorA aa/ticr, PostsriorAnaatis, Topics,
and On Sophirtio Refrtad'ons.
34 See e.g. Aristotle, The Rhebdt ofArotede (Lane Cooper trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1932).
35 
ee id at 7.
36 S id. at 8.
37 See id at 3.
38 See id at 5-6.
39 See id at 1. According to Aristotle, neither dialectic nor rhetoric was a science with its
own subject matter, both were '7anvtes for providing arguments." Il£ at 9-10.
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many prefer writing to teaching and harbor a certain disdain for the practice
of law.40  These educators believe that "coming to a comprehensive
understanding of the law is best accomplished through logic," not
experience.41 This identification with Plato is evidenced by their use of the
combative teaching method Plato learned from Socrates. The typical law
professor engages in a conversation with a student that challenges the student
to articulate her position and then defend it against attack. Often the goal is
to discover some sort of perceived truth about the rule of law or the policies
that drove a particular court's decision. Little or no attempt is made to relate
these truths to their application in practice. The only chance students get to
apply their knowledge is on an exam at the end of the semester.
In contrast, legal writing faculty are more like Aristotle: we take a practical
approach to the study of law, and we recognize that truth can differ based on
the circumstances (i.e., a given memo or brief problem). Typically, we love to
teach, and our goal is to expose students to the tools of persuasion:
identification with the client's purpose, thorough research, articulate analysis,
and effective speaking and writing. We are less concerned about the
"correctness" of an argument than its effectiveness. Students have a tough
time making the transition from the "right and wrong" of doctrinal courses (as
in the professor is right and the student is wrong) to the "works and does not
work" of legal writing. Convinced that there must be an ideal answer to their
hypothetical client's question, students often think we are hiding it from them.
Although we too expect our students to defend their positions against attack,
we rarely take a position on the "best" argument. In teaching our students to
become self-evaluators and self-editors of their writing, we teach them to
judge for themselves what is right or best. Like Aristotle, we adhere to the
view that the value of rhetoric lies in its ability to lead to truth, but we do not
presume to teach what "truth" is in a given context.
The intellectual struggle between philosophy and rhetoric that began with
Plato has continued throughout all of recorded history in a variety of
disciplines. By and large, philosophy has triumphed over rhetoric, and to the
victor belong the spoils. In the field of legal education, philosophy and its
quest for truth (i.e., doctrinal courses) are valued above rhetoric and a lawyer's
facility with language (i.e., clinical and legal writing courses). The reason for
philosophy's ascendancy has been its claim to logic and reason. Although
Aristotle thought that the invention of reason-based arguments fell within the
province of rhetoric, philosophy claimed logic as its own. This left rhetoric
with the study of expression and style, which is today perceived to be the
domain of legal writing. The effect has been to gut rhetoric's intellectual heft.
Consequently, we legal writing faculty are perceived to teach students the
process of expressing the knowledge they get from doctrinal faculty. In plain
terms, doctrinal faculty teach "the law," and we teach grammar, punctuation,
40 Sew Stanchi & Levine, uam n. 2, at 21 n. 94.
41 BosweU, m"ra n. 21, at 1187.
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and citation format. Legal writing is thus considered an intellectually inferior
pursuit, and we who teach it acquire that inferiority by association.
In acient Greece, where social interaction revolved around the spoken
word, rhetoric was a respectable art form in spite of Plato. Greek politicians
made public appeals through speechmaking, and citizens represented
themselves in court. The Romans embraced and improved upon rhetoric,
particularly legal argument. However, its primacy was short-lived; its status as
a separate and substantive discipline was in serious jeopardy before the
Empire began to fall in 410 A.D. As free speech became less available to
Roman citizens and professional orators were hired for courtroom use, the
need to train citizens in rhetorical skills declined rapidly.42 By the first
century, A.D., the art of rhetoric was confined almost exclusively to the
classroom, and its focus shifted from the substance of argument to how
argument should be delivered.43 Professional Roman orators, the "second
sophists," began to deliver speeches designed to entertain and amaze
audiences rather than to persuade them, and their style was deliberately ornate
and excessive. 44 As is true today, not only was rhetoric considered insincere
and manipulative, it became associated with exaggerated and flowery language.
The birth of Christianity contributed even more to rhetoric's fall from
grace. Although Christians believed they had been called to proclaim the
news of Christ, they rejected much of Roman culture, induding the art of
rhetoric.45 The early leaders of the Latin Church had been trained in classical
rhetoric, but they refused to adopt a form of preaching that had its roots in
paganism. As a result, they adopted a plain teaching style that contained none
of the rhetorical devices with which they were familiar.46 In the fifth century,
A.D., however, Augustine of Hippo attempted to revive the art of classical
rhetoric by advocating an elegant preaching style grounded in the teachings of
the great Roman orator, Cicero.47 Augustine was concerned with truth, but
not Plato's form of truth. Augustine believed that the only truth was the word
of God. Undaunted by the fact that rhetoric encouraged opposing points of
view, Augustine believed God's word needed the power of rhetoric behind it
to compete fairly with false prophets.48 Although he was instrumental in
reviving interest in classical rhetoric, Augustine did nothing to reunite logic
42 So George A. Kennedy, Classiadl Rhetwi & It& Chdria & Sadkr Tadtion frnw Amadnt to
Modem Tintr 49 (2d ed., U.N.C. Press 1999); James J. Murphy, Rheoric in the Middk Ag: A
Hirtog of Rhetodivl Theorfrm SaintAnpistin to the Rewairsam 35-36 (U. Cal. Press 1974).
4 See Murphy, sapra n. 42, at 35-37; James J. Murphy & Richard A. Katula, A Syiopti
Hirtog of s/am/ Rheobr 230-33 (3d ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2003).
4See Murphy, pra n. 42, at 35-37; Murphy & Katula, spm n. 43, at 230-33; Golden, jpm
n. 23, at 56-57.
45See #,. Golden, wpm n. 23, at 58-60; Kennedy, snpra n. 42, at 168; Murphy, s m a. 42, at
48-50.
4Murphy, szpm n. 42, at 51.
47 Saint Augustine, Do Dochia Chrstion 118, S 4.2.3-4.3.4. (D.W. Robertson, Jr., trans.,
liberal Arts Press 1958).
4Id at 118-19.
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and rhetoric. Because truth was the unassailable word of God, Augustine saw
no need for logic to evince truth and develop supporting arguments.49 All
Augustine needed was a vehicle for the expression of God's truth.
The predominance of Christian rhetoric signaled the death of classical
rhetoric as a coherent discipline in the Middle Ages. Rhetoric was fractured
into several discrete subjects, such as logic, grammar, poetry, preaching, and
letter writing.50 Although some interest in classical rhetoric survived, it took
the primary form of an interest in Aristotle's treatises on logic in The Orgaton.s1
Aristotle's Rhetoric was virtually ignored until its translation into Latin in the
thirteenth century.52 As a result, logic continued to be severed from rhetoric
in a way that Aristotle did not envision. When university education became
available throughout Europe in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, students
were required to take separate courses in logic, grammar, and rhetoric.5 3 This
itiam became the traditional curriculum for undergraduate education.54 Due
to the separation of logic and rhetoric as well as the obscurity of Aristotle's
Rhetonc, logic dominated the ivit'm.55 Although Aristotle's logic was useful to
lawyers, medieval scholars assumed it was more helpful to philosophers in
answering general questions about man's knowledge of the world.56 In this
way, logic became a part of philosophy, leading the way for doctrinal faculty
to claim "the law" for themselves.
During the European Renaissance, the subjects of classical antiquity were
reunited with their original form.57 Like painting, sculpture, and architecture,
rhetoric was reborn, and once again, it was valued in judicial and other forms
of oratory.58 Not surprisingly, the Renaissance humanists were largely
responsible for rhetoric's revival. They were interested primarily in human
language and interaction, and they viewed rhetoric as a noble art that
showcased "human beings at their best."59 Although Aristotle's Rhetoric had
been translated into Latin more than 200 years earlier, it did not become
popular until the Renaissance.60 The works of Roman rhetoricians as well,
such as Cicero and Quintilian, were re-discovered during this period.61 With
the invention of the printing press, these re-discovered works could be quickly
reproduced and distributed throughout Europe.
49 Se Kennedy, npm n. 42, at 180-81.
30 See e. Murphy, trm n. 42, ch. 3-6.
51 See id at 90.
52 Sgi
53Id at 73.
54 Spe id
55See id at 97 n. 27.
-6 Se g. Kennedy, z~m n. 42, at 201-03; Brian Vickers, Im Dfmae of Rhehic 222-24
(Clarendon Press 1990).
57 Jean Sezne, The SAfiswl of the Paox Gods: The M gl Tradtion ad ift Plas in
Rmaiuaxw Hrwaxim adA 211-13 (B.F. Sessions trans., Pantheon Books 1953).
58 Si Kennedy, ssprv n. 42, at 227-28.
"JlI at 227.
60 Ie at 228-29.
61 Id.
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Unfortunately, the revival of a coherent rhetoric was short-lived. In 1549,
the French logician and humanist, Peter Ramus, wrote a thesis criticizing
Quintilian for failing to understand that the study of rhetoric was restricted to
style and delivery.62 As a teacher of both rhetoric and philosophy, Ramus was
frustrated by the overlap between rhetoric (an art form appealing to logic,
emotion, and character) and philosophy (the science of knowledge acquired
primarily through logic).63 Unlike the Italian humanists, Ramus had no
interest in promoting rhetoric; he wanted to teach students to write in a clear
and simple style, distinctly unlike that of Cicero.64 He decided, therefore, that
logic, the source of knowledge and argument, should forever belong to
philosophy, while style and delivery should belong to rhetoric.65 "Ramism"
had little influence in Italy and Germany, but influenced education in
England, France, and Spain.66 The Puritans brought Ramist beliefs to the
New World, where they quickly took hold.67 Harvard College, for example,
founded in 1636, modeled its curriculum on Ramism.68 Ramus's influence can
be seen today in the allocation of subjects among various college departments:
logic still belongs to philosophy, and style and delivery are divided among
English, speech, and communications departments.69 Aristotle's rhetoric as a
comprehensive discipline is no longer taught in Western colleges and
universities. In fact, students coming to law school with an undergraduate
major in the classics are so few that law schools do not even keep track of
them.
The seventeenth century was marked by the development of
epistemology, the study of how man acquires knowledge. The epistemologists
rejected logic as the path to knowledge. 70 They also rejected the medieval
university system, with its emphasis on Aristotelian logic and the Catholic
Church. Instead, they sought knowledge using inductive methods. Francis
Bacon, for example, articulated a method of careful observation that led from
particular to more general conclusions about the nature of things. Since
human perception was not necessarily reliable, those conclusions then had to
be tested.71 As for logic, the practice of moving from general principles to
particular conclusions, Bacon thought it could only demonstrate the
2 Seem iat 251.
63See id. at 250-51; Edward P.J. Corbett, Claswal Rhtik for the Madem Stmdeat 556 (3d ed.,
Oxford U. Press 1990).
64 Kennedy pra n. 42, at 251; Vickers nmpr n. 56, at 283.
65 See Kennedy, s ra n. 42, at 250-51; Corbett tmp n. 63, at 556; Golden, rupra n. 23, at
65-66 (discussing Ramus's Diakadqse published in 1555).
6Kennedy, smpra n. 42, at 251.
67 ld at 252.
(AI.
69 Golden, s'm n. 23, at 66.
7o See #.& Francis Bacon, Selkcd Philosophica1 Wors, The Nw Or&aon bk. 1, 91 (Rose-Mary
Sargent ed., Hackett Pubig. Co. 1999); John Locke, An Essarj CowxWng Humax Udffdtadig
679 (Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1979).
71 Sea eg. Bacon, spra n. 70, at 89-96.
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relationship between things that were abuy known.72 Like Plato, Bacon's
primary concern was in discovering truth, but he disagreed with Plato that a
contemplative life devoted to dialogue and reason could produce knowledge.73
Although early epistemologists like Bacon, Descartes, Locke, and Vico
agreed that logic could not produce knowledge, they did not agree on the
value of rhetoric. Bacon had been a successful lawyer and judge, and as a
result, perhaps, he knew the value of persuasive speech. Accordingly, Bacon
believed that reason alone was not enough to convince people of the truth:
rhetoric was needed to appeal to the emotions as well. 74 On the other hand,
Descartes, the French philosopher and mathematician, had little interest in
rhetoric.75 Like Bacon, he had a law degree, but he never practiced law.
Descartes believed that "eloquence," his word for rhetoric, was a gift, not a
serious subject of study; one's ability to persuade had little to do with one's
training.76 Like Plato, Descartes thought rhetoric dealt only with probabilities,
and therefore, it could not lead to truth.77 Locke, an English philosopher,
thought rhetoric was a "powerful instrument of Error and Deceit,"78 whereas
Vico, an Italian rhetoric professor, thought rhetoric could actually produce
knowledge.79 With the exception of Vico, even those epistemologists who
championed rhetoric's worth assumed that its function was to communicate
the truths that philosophy (by that time, an inductive process) discovers. In
this way, they perpetuated the division of rhetoric that began with Ramus: the
discovery of knowledge remained with philosophers, leaving rhetoricians with
the sole task of delivering that information.
The epistemologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were far
more enamored of rhetoric than their predecessors, but they did little to
advance its standing as a coherent and substantive discipline. George
Campbell, a Scottish minister, was interested in observing and articulating
principles of argument. His Phrloso.phy of Rheton, published in 1776, combined
the best theories of the ancient and contemporary philosophers. 80 However,
he too believed that knowledge was used in but acquired outside the rhetorical
process. He too rejected logic as the source of knowledge and urged
rhetoricians to use experience, analogy, testimony, and statistics to establish
72 S ei at 91.
735w id
74 Francis Bacon, The Adwwomat of Liamfi 127 (Aichael Kiernan ed., Clarendon Press
2000).
75 ee Kennedy, ssra n. 42, at 269-70.
76 Rene Descartes, Di'are m ho and the Meditado 14 Cohn Veitch trans.,
Prometheus Books 1989).
7 See eg. Golden, norn n. 23, at 92.78 Locke, s*m r. 70, at 508.
79 Se Golden, nom n. 23, at 95; Giambattista Vico, TheArt ofRheto c 7 (Giorgio A. Pinton
& Arthur W. Shippee eds. & trans., Value Inquiry Book Series 1996).
80 George Campbell, The Phihophy of Retorc (Charles Ewer 1823).
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the existence of facts."1 Although Campbell was not troubled by rhetoric's
probabilities as Plato was, he did hold a certain contempt for lawyers.
Campbell observed that even in his day, lawyers' explanations of the law had
become so complicated and convoluted as to become "distinguished by the
name chicane."82 Richard Whately, another of rhetoric's devotees, was an
English priest in the Anglican Church. Like Campbell, he was interested in
rhetoric and its ability to defend Christian beliefs in an age of growing
secularism. Whately published Elements of Rhetoric in 1828, which explored in
detail the nature of evidence, presumptions, and burdens of proof.83
Although his text became the precursor to modem argumentation theory,
Whately too viewed the art of rhetoric as the process of putting together
arguments acquired elsewhere.84 However, he disagreed with Campbell on
the value of logic, criticizing Campbelrs "ignorance and utter misconception"
of its nature and object.85
By the end of the nineteenth century, the interest in rhetoric had shifted
from argument to literature. Stripped of the task of inventing argument,
rhetoric evolved into the study of expression and style. Known as the Belle
Lettres Movement, this shift was led by Hugh Blair, a Scottish minister and
professor of rhetoric.86 Influenced by On the Sbhime,87 an ancient Roman
treatise which attempted to define taste, beauty, and sublimity, Blair and other
belletristic scholars searched for taste, beauty, and sublimity in poetry, prose,
and argument."8 Their study of all types of literature ultimately transformed
rhetoric from the study of argument into the study of literature generally.
Blair's Detirus on Rhetoric and Belk Leathrs,'9 published in 1783, continued to be
used in English and American schools until nearly the end of the nineteenth
century.90 The impact of the Belle Lettres Movement was to eliminate
rhetoric from most college curricula and replace it with courses in literary
interpretation and composition. The discovery of knowledge - the
substance of argument - was left entirely to philosophy departments.
Blair acknowledged rhetoric's reputation as a "contemptible art,"9' but like
Campbell and Whately, he believed it was useful, primarily for defending
81 James L Golden & Edward P.J. Corbett, The Rhetonc of B/air, Cawpb4 and lWhat/v 187-
97 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1968).
8 St id at 231.
83 Richard Whately, Ek*IIIr ofRborir (Douglas Ehninger ed., S. Ill. U. Press 1963).
84 So Golden & Corbett, jabra n. 81, at 14.
85 Id at 284.
6 Se . at 24-25.
7 Se aSoa Longinus, Ot The Subir (James A Arieti & John M. Crossett trans., E. Mellen
Press 1985). Longinus was an unknown Roman author, who published this treatise sometime
during the first century, A.D. At that time, the goal of the second sophists was to amaze, not to
persuade. Sue s~ra nn. 43-44 and accompanying text.
B Se Golden, sp n. 23, at 75-76.
89 Hugh Blair, Lares n Rheor*" and Blk Len vol. I, II (Harold F. Harding ed., S. Ill. U.
Press 1965).
90 Golden & Corbett, mpm n. 81, at 25.
91 Blair, ssrm n. 89, at vol. 1I, lecture XXV, 2.
Fall 2006
120 Journal of the Assodaon of Legal Wtifing Diecors Vol. 3
Christian beliefs. According to Blair, an effective rhetorician was the "most
eloquent man,"92 and in his view, there was always room for eloquence. With
regard to legal argument, he believed that a lawyer's goal was to persuade
judges about truth and justice in a particular case, and a lawyer should appeal
primarily to reason.93 Although these later epistemologists revived interest in
the construction of legal arguments, they perpetuated the schism between
logic, reason, induction and the expression of argument. That schism is
represented today in the notion that doctrinal courses teach substance, while
legal writing courses teach composition and grammar.
IV. The Adoption of a Philosophical Rather than Practical Approach
to Legal Education
As rhetoric evolved into the study of literature, law schools were forming
in the United States. Tapping Reeve, a practicing lawyer in Litchfield,
Connecticut, opened The Litchfield Law School in 1775,4 and in 1779,
William and Mary College in Virginia hired its first law professor.95 These
early schools took diverse approaches to teaching law. Litchfield, for
example, focused on teaching legal principles and their application to any
situation," while William and Mary offered a broader range of studies in law,
politics, history, and science.97  In 1817, Harvard formally adopted a
professional model for legal education and offered the first post-graduate
degree for the practice of law.98 By the early 1870s, however, rationalism was
all the rage, and legal educators became convinced that law should be taught
more as a science than an art. In 1873, Charles Eliot, then President of
Harvard University, stated in his annual report for academic year 1873-74 that
"[a] false analogy between medical education and legal education... had led
many to believe that practitioners would make the best teachers of law."99
Medicine, Eliot said, could be learned from the bodies of the sick and
wounded; law, on the other hand, "is to be learned exclusively from the books
in which its principles and precedents are recorded, digested, and
explained." 100 Christopher Langdell, then Dean of Harvard Law School,
articulated his vision of the ideal law professor:
[A] teacher of law should be a person who accompanies his pupils on
a road which is new to them, but with which he is well acquainted
92 Id
93 Id at vol II, lecture XXVIII, 74-76.
94 See Charles KI. McManis, The Hitto, of Fint Cetmg Attwima L Edta'oe: A Randriit
Pmpcu, 59 Wash. U. LQ. 597, 617 (1981).
95 Id at 609.
9Sr id at 617-18.
9Se id at 609-12.
9 See id at 607, 627.
99William P. LaPiana, Lai & E, rniaw The Orji of Modem Aaenian L4d Edcatioa 15
(Oxford U. Press 1994)
1w Id
from having often traveled it before. What qualifies a person,
therefore, to teach law, is not experience in the wrkA of a lawyers office, not
experience in dealing with men, not experience in the trial or
argument of causes, not experience, in short, in using law, but
experience in learning law.101
Accordingly, Harvard made dramatic changes to its law school, including
the establishment of a full-time faculty, whose qualifications for teaching were
their scholarship potential as opposed to their success in practice. 102 In
Platonic fashion, Harvard claimed "to provide the only true method" for
training lawyers and thus converted the process for training lawyers from an
apprenticeship system to an academic system "dominated by a new division of
the profession - full-time teachers of law."103
Then a major shift in legal pedagogy cemented the schism between the
teaching and practice of law. Legal treatises, which had been used to train
practitioners, were set aside in favor of judicial opinions, which were chosen
to discover the true law.104 Like Eliot, Langdell believed that law should be
taught as a science that yields predictable results. 105 Langdell had been a
successful lawyer in New York, and he was familiar with the case method of
teaching law that had been introduced at New York University. 06 In the early
1870s, Langdell convinced Eliot that Harvard should adopt it. Like the early
epistemologists, Langdell believed an inductive method could lead to the
discovery of truth (i.e., the true principles of law).107 Indeed, one of Langdell's
own students said that "his earnest endeavor was to lead his pupils to be as
unerring as possible in their search for the truth."08
Up until then, law had been taught through lecture or recitation (the
practice of quizzing students on definitions and rules from their assigned
reading such as treatises). Langdelrs new method was Socratic; he questioned
students about the cases they had read for class and encouraged them to think
for themselves - to articulate and critique the court's reasoning. At first,
students were opposed to Langdell's method because he was not teaching
101 Christopher C. Langdell, Twchiq Law as a Sdow, 21 Am. L Rev. 123-24 (1887)
(Langdeli's after-dinner speech to the Harvard Law School Association) (emphasis added). See
a/o Robert Stevens, Law Sdook L" Edacaiion flum & 1850s to the 1980s 38 (U.N.C. Press
1983).
102 Stevens, .n n. 101, at 38-39; McManis, na n. 94, at 630.
103 LaPiana, apm n. 99, at 7.
104 See McManis, usxm n. 94, at 630.
105 See id at 633; Langdell, .am n. 101, at 123 ("L]aw is a science,.... If law not be a
science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science, it
is a species of handicraft [recall Plato's analogy to cookery], and may best be learned by serving
an apprenticeship to one who practices it.).
106 McManis, .ra n. 94, at 633.
107 Sm i; Bruce A. Kimball, Chritlpher Lagdelk" The Case of an 'Abominwia' iv Teaig
Pradie, 20 NEA Higher Educ. J. 23,25 (Summer 2004).
HIS Kimball, npm n. 107, at 28.
Fall 2006 Phboph v. rhetoric
Joimal of the Assodation of Legal Writing Diredors
them black letter law.1°9 Despite these complaints, Langdell won his students
over, and the case method gradually became accepted. By the mid-1890s,
several law schools, including Columbia, Northwestern, Comell, and Stanford
had switched to the case method.1 0 The nineteenth century's formal
adoption of a truth-seeking, Socratic approach to legal education was
monumental; it forever changed the conception of law school as a trade
school, practical and Aristotelian, to an ivory tower, theoretical and Platonic.
Once the scientific approach to teaching law took hold, the "art of
rhetoric" became irrelevant. Law school was about discovering principles of
law, and these principles were the province of legal scholars, not practitioners.
Langdell's successors soon realized that the Socratic method was better for
teaching legal reasoning than independent principles of law."' Nevertheless,
the Socratic method of teaching persists, and doctrinal faculty still act as truth
finders, striving to mold minds that can participate meaningfully in their quest
for truth, with little or no regard for the students' ability to practice law.
Clinical programs did not appear until the late 1960s in response to political
pressure, and legal writing programs appeared some ten to twenty years
later.112 Although critical to the modem law student's education, these
practical courses are seen as dffitrnt. They allow students to practice applying
legal principles or truths in a given context, but they are not perceived to
teach any sort of independent truth. In rhetorical terms, they teach students
solely expression and style.
V. Modern Rhetoric's Continued Treatment as a Discipline Without
Substance Despite Its Contribution to Understanding the Nature of
Truth
At the turn of the twentieth century, there was a resurgence of scholarly
interest in rhetoric that went far beyond literature. Particularly in the United
States, non-legal scholars began to explore the nature of human
communication in all contexts, not just legal argument. Since then, the study
of rhetoric has expanded to include, for example, the study of the meaning of
language,113 language as a system of signs," 4 the impact of situation and
culture on forms of communication,'15 the influence of modem media on
modes of communication,11 6 the ethical choices inherent in forms of
10 9 Seeid at 31.
110 Id at 34.
111 Sm McManis, a"pm n. 94, at 633-34.
112 See Boswell, pra n. 21, at 1187-88; Stanchi & Levine, s~ra n. 2, at 7.
113 See eg. I.A. Richards, The Phiisophy of Rtork (Oxford U. Press 1936); C. K. Ogden &
IA. Richards, The Meanin of Meaing (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1972).
14 See a& Roland Barthes, Ekhwawt of SehuioI (Annette Layers & Colin Smith trans., Hill
& Wang 1968); Umberto Eco, A Theomy f "vSwioda (Ind. U. Press 1976).
Its See eg. Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Siraliof, 1 Phil. & Rhetoric 1 (1968); Kenneth
Burke, A Grawmar ofModws (U. Cal. Press 1969); Kenneth Burke, A Rheod of Moms (Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 1950).
116 See .& Marshall McLuhan, Utdkmsdaia Mada: The Exn*wi of'An (MIT Press 1996).
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communication,' t7 the teaching of English composition, the processes of
argumentation in all aspects of life,"' s and the psychology of social
movements, such as the Civil Rights Movement" 19
The common thread among these established disciplines is the profound
shift in thinking on the nature of knowledge and truth. As early as the 1950s,
Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman began to contribute significantly to the
contemporary philosophers' view that truth is indeed relative. In Uses of
Argtment, Toulmin borrowed principles from legal argument to help explain
how people reason and acquire knowledge. 120 Recognizing that people do not
reason using formal, Aristotelian logic in everyday life, Toulmin advanced a
new model of argument, now referred to as "informal logic."'1' In Toulmin's
view, informal argument leads to the discovery of knowledge, but no
knowledge is absolute; at best, it is probabe.122  Like Toulmin, Perelman
believed that appeals to reason lead only to probable truths. In 1970, he
wrote:
[W]e must recognize that the appeal to reason must be identified not
as an appeal to a single truth but instead as an appeal for the
adherence of an audience which can be thought of... as
encompassing all reasonable and competent men.t23
By the twentieth century, Plato's quest for absolute truth had become
obsolete. Not only had truth become relative, it had become the product of a
rhetorical process.
This shift in understanding about the nature of truth has had a profound
impact on the teaching of doctrinal law and legal scholarship, but ironically, it
has had virtually no impact on the intellectual status of rhetoric, writing, or
writing faculty. In the 1920s and 1930s, for example, Langdell's theory that
law could be taught as a science - that the application of law to fact yields
predictable results - gave way to a more practical understanding of how
judges decide individual cases. As early as 1897, Justice Holmes had criticized
the notion that "the only force at work in the development of law is logic."'12 4
Speaking nearly a generation before the scholars known later as realists,
117 See r. Richard M. Weaver, The Ehia ofRhetoric (Henry Regnery Co. 1953).
I's See #. Stephen E. Toulmin, User of ArAt (updated ed., Cambridge U. Press 2003);
Chaim Perelman, The Real, of Rhetori (William Kluback trans., U. Notre Dame Press 1982);
Chaim Perelman & L Obrechts-Tyteca, The Nw Rhotodi.1 A Tre ae on AtigvMenatiox (John
Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., U. Notre Dame Press 1969).
119 eo a Golden, jmr n. 23, at ch. 17.
12 0 So Toulmin, ,pm n. 118.
121 See id. at 94-134, where Toulmin sets out his model of argument consisting of data, a
claim, warrant, qualifier, rebuttal, and backing.
122 See Golden, s~m n. 23, at 210.
173 Chaim Perelman, The Nw Rhstoc A Theogt of Pmetiml Rsaoaig Great Ideas Today
(Ency. Britannica, Inc. 1970), nprntdin Golden, is m n. 23, at 234-52.
124 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path oft&e Lwa, 10 Harv. L Rev. 457, 465 (1896-97).
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Holmes rejected the "science" of law, stating that judges decide cases by
resolving competing and relative interests, and that the judicial process
necessarily involves subjective judgment.125 By 1930, Holmes' view that case
outcomes are determined by a host of factors had taken firm root in legal
scholarship. Karl Llewellyn, a then-young law professor at Columbia
University, used to tell his students that rules of law were helpful only insofar
as they helped lawyers predict what judges will do.12 In The Brambk Bush,
Llewellyn demonstrated that precedent could be read either narrowly or
broadly, and neither logic nor precedent could provide certainty as to
outcome; they merely demonstrated the range of posibk outcomes. 27 Most
important, Llewellyn demonstrated that the truth about the law is relative.
In the wake of Llewellyn and later realists, modem legal scholars' interest
in understanding "the truth" about law and its ability to serve justice exploded.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, legal scholars formed social
movements that seriously questioned deep-seated assumptions about the
"rule" of law and the fairness of our legal system. In the late 1970s, the
Critical Legal Studies Movement took LleweUyn's range of possible outcomes,
the "indeterminacy of law," as a sign of an essentially corrupt system.128 The
invitation to the first conference on Critical Legal Studies (CLS) in 1977
declared that "law is an instrument of social, economic, and political
domination, both in the sense of furthering the concrete interests of the
dominators and in that of legitimating the existing legal order."129 Principles
of law thus reflect the power of certain social groups, not universal truths.
Law is essentially politics and, as Plato thought, not to be trusted. In Plato's
terms, law is the product of a political process; it constitutes opinion only,
currying favor by appealing to those groups with the most economic power.130
Soon thereafter, a host of legal theories developed which are also based
on a belief that law is not an independent source of truth; it simply reflects
truth as it is viewed and imposed by different social groups. Critical race
theorists, for example, argue that our society is still racist, despite the law's
ostensible effort to create equal rights. 131 From their point of view, neutral
rules of law serve to perpetuate the entrenchment of the white majority's
125 Sm ii at 466-68.
12 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Braibk Barb 4 (Oceana Publications 1930).
127 Id at 66-67. S aso Karl N. Llewellyn, Rmwarks w the Thewy of Appeht Dedion and the
Rki Or CaGo About How Statfu Am to Be Consthw 3 Vand. L Rev. 395 (1950).
128 S a& Duncan Kennedy, L41al Edcation and the Rralondg' of Himrry. A Polenic
Against te Sytei (N.Y.U. Press 2004); Mark V. Tushnet, CtidcLga StAdie: A PoliticalHisto?,
100 Yale L.J. 1515 (1991); Roberto Unger, Knowke and Politiks (Free Press 1975).
129 See ag. Louis B. Schwartz, With Gxn and Camera Throagh Darkut CIS-Land, 36 Stan. L
Rev. 413, 417 (1984) (quoting Intitation to First Confiee on Ciia lLgaStdia, Jan. 17,1977).
13So sapra nn. 26-27 and accompanying text.
131 See e& Derrick Bell, Race, Radua andAmnensan Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1973); Charles
R. Lawrence m, The L4 The F, a Eqtxl Pmtction: Reckoning With Uncowiow Raism, 39 Stan.
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Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 323 (1987).
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power.132 Feminist legal theorists also question the existence of a neutral legal
order, arguing that individual rights have evolved from the male perspective,
thus suppressing the female voice and denying equality for women.133
Modem rhetoric has thus enabled a relativistic view of truth that is widely
embraced today in the legal scholarship of doctrinal faculty. This enlightened
view might have had an effect on the importance of teaching legal writing as
part of a rhetorical process that defines cultural "truths," but it has had exactly
the opposite effect. In order to maintain the existing power structure,
doctrinal faculty must keep "truth finding" for themselves. The only way to
do that is to conceptualize the search for truth as an exclusively philosophical
endeavor. Only then does the view of legal research and writing as a course in
style and citation format continue to make sense. From a legal feminist's
point of view, the male-dominated legal academy suppresses the voices of
female legal writing faculty in order to preserve the status quo. Moreover, we
can be characterized as teaching students how to engage in the process that
enables domination and injustice to persist. As a mere purveyor of social,
economic, and political domination, legal writing is not only tainted, it lacks
independent substance. The irony, of course, is that legal scholars themselves
engage in the rhetorical process for discovering truth - a process that they
formally eschew. In the marketplace of ideas, their opinions vie for
legitimacy, and thus, like Aristotle, legal scholars implicitly recognize that the
clash of differing viewpoints may lead to the best form of truth.
While doctrinal faculty view legal writing as a course primarily about
pnwss, some have serious doubts about whether the process can actually be
taught. This Cartesian view blinds them to the possibility that one can learn
to write well and that writing can generate knowledge. Most tenured faculty
teaching for more than twenty years did not have a legal writing course in law
school, and therefore, on some level, they doubt the need for it. There is a
certain inchoate belief that either one can or cannot write: if a student has
made it all the way to law school and still cannot write, it is probably too late.
Descartes articulated this view more than 350 years ago:
Those in whom the faculty of reason is predominant, and who most
skillfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them dear and
intelligible, are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of
what they lay down, though they.., be wholly ignorant of the rules
of rhetoric.134
132 Se e.g Richard Delgado, The Impeial Scolar Rejbkiear an a Reaww of Cil Rb l.iUratm
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In the end, there is a suspicion that to devote any more time and energy to
legal writing than we already do would be a waste. The problem, of course, is
that knowing the law is not the same as knowing how to apply it. Moreover,
not all of our students are born writers. As the report of the National
Commission on Writing indicates, when schools stop teaching writing, the
quality of student writing declines. 135
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
Doctrinal legal faculty perpetuate the view that legal education is a
philosophical endeavor that focuses on the "truth" about the nature of law
and, in the twenty-first century, on the law's ability to serve justice in a multi-
cultural America. Because of their political power, however, doctrinal faculty
are able to preserve the task of truth finding for themselves. Since the nature
of truth is independent of its practical application, those of us who teach legal
writing are simply not part of the academy's intellectual enterprise. At best,
we teach a process for conveying truth, and at worst, we teach students how
to engage in the process of manipulation and domination. Because most of us
are women, and because we teach a process that lacks substance and perhaps
even value, we are discriminated against. The reality is that we both teach
"truth": doctrinal faculty teach students "the truth" about a specific body of
law and its evolution, while legal writing faculty teach students how to
interpret and apply that same truth in a specific context. Like Stanchi and
Levine, we should not "rest until [legal writing faculty] are considered full,
participating members of the legal academy and our students receive the
training they deserve."136
I do not presume to have all the answers on how to achieve these goals.
However, first and foremost, we need to say it like it is. Not just in law review
articles but also to ourselves, our colleagues, doctrinal faculty, deans, alumni,
and students: we are discriminated against because we are perceived as women
who teach an intellectually inferior and unworthy subject. This is absurd,
outrageous, and unacceptable. We teach a complex and sophisticated art form
that combines the acquisition of knowledge - the law itself - and its
application - persuasive technique. In researching and writing a memo or
brief, students find and synthesize controlling law to invent the major
premises for their conclusions. In applying these premises to the facts of their
case, students often engage in analogy and distinction, using the facts and
policies of case decisions to predict or argue for a certain outcome. At the
same time, students must anticipate their audiences' needs in the way they
construct documents, frame issues, characterize facts, reason, and cite to
authority. They must first suppress some of their writing instincts in order to
learn the discourse of the legal community and, once they assimilate it, draw
again on their own creativity. Then, and only then, do students and legal
writing faculty focus on grammar, punctuation, and spelling. In sum, we teach
135 Swe The Natl. Commn. on Writing in America's Schools & Colleges, uupm n. 14.
136 See Stanchi & Levine, ujra n. 2, at 20.
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legal reasoning as much as doctrinal faculty do, and as twentieth century legal
scholarship demonstrates, that process not only seeks knowledge, it ,generats
knowledge. We know these things, but we must speak them out loud. We
gain absolutely nothing by standing on the sidelines waiting to be recognized.
We work as hard as or harder than doctrinal faculty, struggling to keep up
with heavy course loads and to publish at the same time. We are major
contributors to our students' success but earn a fraction of our colleagues'
salaries. That is unfair, and we must say so.
Second, we must not make the same mistake we accuse doctrinal faculty
of and believe that all we really teach is process. Instead of settling for
composition and grammar, we must reclaim the substance of rhetoric and
teach it. The topics to choose from are as varied as our imaginations:
Aristotle's theories on logic, rhetoric, and poetry; the Romans' contributions
to rhetoric in the works of Cicero and Quintilian; the views of the eighteenth
century epistemologists on argument and their interest in defining beauty and
sublimity; the informal logic of Toulimin and Perelman; and the post-modern
struggle for "best truths" in legal scholarship, to name a few. Some or all of
these subjects would give our teaching the intellectual cornerstone that
Aristotle envisioned for rhetoric, truly making it the counterpart to dialectic in
the doctrinal classroom. The "how to" approach to legal writing (e.g.,
formulas and samples) that we all use is a necessary part of our teaching.
However, we cannot be afraid to teach legal analysis explicitly and tread on
the territory of our doctrinal colleagues. Finally, we should resist pressure to
write about "substantive law" (i.e., doctrinal subjects). Our scholarship, too,
should explore the substantive aspects of rhetoric, and the rich world of
modem rhetorical theory is our oyster.137
Third, as history teaches us, we are not going to elevate the status of legal
writing on its merits alone. Law schools must now afford clinical faculty a
tenure equivalent, but not because the academy opened its arms to them. Like
theirs was and to some extent still is,138 ours is a political problem. Simply
asking doctrinal faculty to elevate the status of legal writing, without more, is a
lot like asking a partner to take less of the firm's profit for the same amount of
work. Therefore, our strategy must include motivating students, alumnae, and
local law practices to pressure law school administrators to allocate more time
and resources to legal writing. The annual ALWD/LWI survey provides
excellent information on trends in legal writing programs, and schools like
Mercer University and Seattle University have demonstrated how progressive
legal writing programs can be. We may need to advocate for more credits,
137 See eg. Linda L. Berger, What is the Sond of a Corpmdotn Sea kixg? How the Cogiim
TheeoF of Metaphor Can H4 Lawnyn Shaoe the Law, 2 J. ALWD 169 (2004); Michael Frost, Cv,-
Rawaa Aaabsrr of MeMShoic Rearniag& 2 Leg. Writing 113 (1996); Laurel Currie Oates, Bqoad
Commnitawtion: WUiq as a Meaw of LmamiA , 6 Leg. Writing 1 (2000); Kristen K. Robbins,
Paradig Lat. Re&aphi Clssical Rheton to Validate Lea Reasun& 27 Vt. L Rev. 483 (2003);
Anita Schnee, L4a Rsm u "Obiow, " 3 Leg. Writing 105 (1997); and the articles published
in this issue on rhetoric and argumentation.
138 Se smpv n. 21.
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increased teaching time, smaller classes, the hiring of full-time faculty,
increased writing requirements for graduating law students, or more upper-
class courses. For ourselves, we may need to advocate for the same rights as
our doctrinal colleagues: salaries based on merit and experience, voting rights,
reduced course loads, sabbaticals, and summer grants for research. 139
When I first started teaching, I was thrilled to return to legal education
even though my sense was that the second-class status of legal writing seemed
a bit elitist and out of touch with the demands of actual practice. Once I
realized the prejudice extends beyond legal writing to its faculty, I was both
furious and crushed. In the early 1990s, our number seemed too few and our
profession too young and unformed to effect any significant change.
However, things have changed a great deal since then, and now is the time to
seize opportunity and make more change. Political strugles such as these are
painful, frightening, and isolating. That alone has prevented most of us from
speaking out against what we know to be unfair. But we cannot expect to be
treated with respect unless we first respect ourselves. And that's just true.
139 1 would like to acknowledge here the efforts of Georgetown's new dean, Alex
Aleinikoff, to improve the status of legal writing courses at Georgetown. In April 2006, at his
urging, the law faculty approved a proposal to double the size of our legal writing faculty and to
reduce class size from 120 to thirty. An increase in credits, from three to four, is expected
within the next academic year. Unfortmately, no changes to the status of Georgetown's legal
writing faculty were proposed.
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